

**16.403-2 Fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contracts.**

(a) *Description.* (1) A fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contract specifies the following elements, all of which are negotiated at the outset:

- (i) An initial target cost.
- (ii) An initial target profit.
- (iii) An initial profit adjustment formula to be used for establishing the firm target profit, including a ceiling and floor for the firm target profit. (This formula normally provides for a lesser degree of contractor cost responsibility than would a formula for establishing final profit and price.)
- (iv) The production point at which the firm target cost and firm target profit will be negotiated (usually before delivery or shop completion of the first item).
- (v) A ceiling price that is the maximum that may be paid to the contractor, except for any adjustment under other contract clauses providing for equitable adjustment or other revision of the contract price under stated circumstances.

(2) When the production point specified in the contract is reached, the parties negotiate the firm target cost, giving consideration to cost experience under the contract and other pertinent factors. The firm target profit is established by the formula. At this point, the parties have two alternatives, as follows:

- (i) They may negotiate a firm fixed price, using the firm target cost plus the firm target profit as a guide.
- (ii) If negotiation of a firm fixed price is inappropriate, they may negotiate a formula for establishing the final price using the firm target cost and firm target profit. The final cost is then negotiated at completion, and the final profit is established by formula, as under the fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract (see 16.403-1 above).

(b) *Application.* A fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contract is appropriate when—

- (1) Available cost or pricing information is not sufficient to permit the negotiation of a realistic firm target cost and profit before award;
- (2) Sufficient information is available to permit negotiation of initial targets; and

(3) There is reasonable assurance that additional reliable information will be available at an early point in the contract performance so as to permit negotiation of either (i) a firm fixed price or (ii) firm targets and a formula for establishing final profit and price that will provide a fair and reasonable incentive. This additional information is not limited to experience under the contract, itself, but may be drawn from other contracts for the same or similar items.

(c) *Limitations.* This contract type may be used only when—

- (1) The contractor's accounting system is adequate for providing data for negotiating firm targets and a realistic profit adjustment formula, as well as later negotiation of final costs; and
- (2) Cost or pricing information adequate for establishing a reasonable firm target cost is reasonably expected to be available at an early point in contract performance.

(d) *Contract Schedule.* The contracting officer shall specify in the contract Schedule the initial target cost, initial target profit, and initial target price for each item subject to incentive price revision.

[48 FR 42219, Sept. 19, 1983, as amended at 59 FR 64785, Dec. 15, 1994]

**16.404 Fixed-price contracts with award fees.**

(a) Award-fee provisions may be used in fixed-price contracts when the Government wishes to motivate a contractor and other incentives cannot be used because contractor performance cannot be measured objectively. Such contracts shall—

- (1) Establish a fixed price (including normal profit) for the effort. This price will be paid for satisfactory contract performance. Award fee earned (if any) will be paid in addition to that fixed price; and
- (2) Provide for periodic evaluation of the contractor's performance against an award-fee plan.

(b) A solicitation contemplating award of a fixed-price contract with award fee shall not be issued unless the following conditions exist:

- (1) The administrative costs of conducting award-fee evaluations are not

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expected to exceed the expected benefits;

(2) Procedures have been established for conducting the award-fee evaluation;

(3) The award-fee board has been established; and

(4) An individual above the level of the contracting officer approved the fixed-price-award-fee incentive.

[62 FR 12696, Mar. 17, 1997]

### 16.405 Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.

See 16.301 for requirements applicable to all cost-reimbursement contracts, for use in conjunction with the following subsections.

[48 FR 42219, Sept. 19, 1983. Redesignated at 62 FR 12696, Mar. 17, 1997]

#### 16.405-1 Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts.

(a) *Description.* The cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for the initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula based on the relationship of total allowable costs to total target costs. This contract type specifies a target cost, a target fee, minimum and maximum fees, and a fee adjustment formula. After contract performance, the fee payable to the contractor is determined in accordance with the formula. The formula provides, within limits, for increases in fee above target fee when total allowable costs are less than target costs, and decreases in fee below target fee when total allowable costs exceed target costs. This increase or decrease is intended to provide an incentive for the contractor to manage the contract effectively. When total allowable cost is greater than or less than the range of costs within which the fee-adjustment formula operates, the contractor is paid total allowable costs, plus the minimum or maximum fee.

(b) *Application.* (1) A cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is appropriate for services or development and test programs when—

(i) A cost-reimbursement contract is necessary (see 16.301-2) and

(ii) A target cost and a fee adjustment formula can be negotiated that

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are likely to motivate the contractor to manage effectively.

(2) The contract may include technical performance incentives when it is highly probable that the required development of a major system is feasible and the Government has established its performance objectives, at least in general terms. This approach may also apply to other acquisitions, if the use of both cost and technical performance incentives is desirable and administratively practical.

(3) The fee adjustment formula should provide an incentive that will be effective over the full range of reasonably foreseeable variations from target cost. If a high maximum fee is negotiated, the contract shall also provide for a low minimum fee that may be a zero fee or, in rare cases, a negative fee.

(c) *Limitations.* No cost-plus-incentive-fee contract shall be awarded unless all limitations in 16.301-3 are complied with.

[48 FR 42219, Sept. 19, 1983. Redesignated at 62 FR 12696, Mar. 17, 1997, as amended at 62 FR 44815, Aug. 22, 1997]

#### 16.405-2 Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.

(a) *Description.* A cost-plus-award-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for a fee consisting of (1) a base amount fixed at inception of the contract and (2) an award amount that the contractor may earn in whole or in part during performance and that is sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in such areas as quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and cost-effective management. The amount of the award fee to be paid is determined by the Government's judgmental evaluation of the contractor's performance in terms of the criteria stated in the contract. This determination and the methodology for determining the award fee are unilateral decisions made solely at the discretion of the Government.

(b) *Application.* (1) The cost-plus-award-fee contract is suitable for use when—

(i) The work to be performed is such that it is neither feasible nor effective